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THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
LOYALTY: UNDERSTANDING THE SELF-INTERESTED
DIRECTOR TRANSACTION
Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
For some years there has been a debate about whether the corporation, as a
matter of freedom of contract, should be substantially liberated from
mandatory requirements with respect to the relations between shareholders
and management, including the board of directors.' As a practical matter,
what is being proposed is no less than the abolishment of the corporate direc-
tor's fiduciary duty of loyalty.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. A.B., LL.B., Harvard University;
LL.M., New York University. Professor Beveridge is a former member of the American Bar As-
sociation Committee on Corporate Law Departments and chief legal officer of a New York Stock
Exchange-listed manufacturing corporation. This Article was made possible by a research grant
from the Kerr Foundation at Oklahoma City University. The author gratefully acknowledges the
constructive counsel of Assistant Professors Jay Conison and Edward J. Eberle, colleagues on the
faculty of the O.C.U. School of Law, and the research assistance of Ann Michael, a student at the
school.
1. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (calling for more study of corporate governance before relaxation of
government intervention); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:
A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (advocating opt-out provi-
sions for corporations); Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Fail-
ure and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1991) (rejecting applications of contract theory to
replace fiduciary principles in the corporate context); Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (containing various essays discussing the ability of
corporations to opt out of the rules of corporate law).
2. See Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts To Curtail the Fiduciary
Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988). In
fact, the abolition of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is being proposed on the partnership level, too.
See Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project To Revise the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 111, 138 (1990). Professor Ribstein states that mandatory fiduciary duties
recently were abolished for limited partnerships in Delaware. Id. at 138 n.99. However, the new
Delaware statute stops short of actually allowing abolishment. The Delaware Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act provides in relevant part as follows:
(c) It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle of free-
dom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.
(d) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner has duties (including fiduciary
duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited partnership or to another partner,
(1) any such partner acting under a partnership agreement shall not be liable to the
limited partnership or to any such other partner for the partner's good faith reliance
on the provisions of such partnership agreement, and (2) the partner's duties and
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The use of the term "fiduciary" itself is being avoided. The American Bar
Association Committee on Corporate Laws in its 1984 revision of the Model
Business Corporation Act stated that the term "fiduciary" should not be used
in the statute to refer to a director.3 The American Law Institute has just
published its massive Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations,4 the culmination of years of effort since 1978, which also ex-
cludes the use of the word "fiduciary" to refer to a corporate director in its
black letter rules. Yet, there is no doubt that a corporate director is a
fiduciary.5
With respect to the corporate director's fiduciary duty of loyalty, this is also
beyond question and in fact is all that is signified by the term "fiduciary." 6
While it is also said that a corporate director has a fiduciary duty of care,
there is nothing uniquely fiduciary about a director's duty of care.7
It does not help matters that the American Law Institute itself has also
stopped using the term "duty of loyalty" to describe a director's obligation to
refrain from self-dealing. 8 The use of the new term "duty of fair dealing" is
unfortunate because nonfiduciaries also have a duty of good faith and fair
dealing,9 but not a fiduciary duty of loyalty,' 0 and it only confuses the situa-
tion to use the same term to describe two completely different obligations. The
liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in a partnership agreement.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (Supp. 1990).
3. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) cmt. at 222 (1984). "Section 8.30 does not use the
term 'fiduciary' in the standard for directors' conduct, because that term could be confused with
the unique attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts, some of which
are not appropriate for directors of a corporation." Id.
4. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (A.L.I. Ten-
tative Draft No. 11, 1991) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
5. J.C. SHEPHERD. THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 355 (1981) ("The fiduciary relationship between
director and corporation is unquestioned. It is the cornerstone of the directors' office, and as such
has become trite law.").
6. Id. at 48 ("The duty of loyalty is, of course, the essence of the fiduciary relationship ....
There is no causal relationship between the duty of loyalty and the fiduciary relationship---they
are one and the same thing.").
7. Id. at 49 ("[Tlhe duty of care has absolutely no necessary connection with fiduciary rela-
tionships."); see Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (stating that the duty of care is not distinctively fiduciary).
8. This decision was announced in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS at xi n. (A.L.I. Tentative Draft No. 7, 1987). The title of Part V has accord-
ingly been changed from "Duty of Loyalty" to "Duty of Fair Dealing." See PRINCIPLES, supra
note 4, at 259.
9. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3), 2-103(l)(b) (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
205 (1979); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes "Good Faith" Under UCC § 1-208
Dealing with "Insecure" or "At Will" Acceleration Clauses, 85 A.L.R.4TH 284 (1991).
10. For a dramatic illustration of the difference, see Rajala v. Allied Corp., 919 F.2d 610 (10th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1685 (1991). In Rajala, the purchaser, under an agreement to
develop and supply high-molecular-weight resins, saw its breach-of-contract claims dismissed by
directed verdict but persuaded a jury to grant $70 million in compensatory and punitive damages
for breach of fiduciary duty. On appeal, the judgment for plaintiff was reversed on the grounds
that under applicable state law no fiduciary duty existed. Id. at 625.
1992] FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY 657
explanation offered is that courts have used the term "duty of loyalty" to refer
to situations other than pecuniary interest self-dealing, and it is desirable to
use a different term to isolate that situation from the others."
It can certainly be agreed that the corporate director's fiduciary duty of
loyalty pervades the law of corporations. In fact, if it were possible to abolish
the duty of loyalty, there would be no law of corporations so far as the rela-
tions among the shareholders, the board of directors, and management are
concerned. 2 It is readily apparent that among our largest corporations con-
flict-of-interest transactions are prevalent, and these transactions have always
been resolved by duty-of-loyalty analysis.'"
It is the purpose of this Article to make the case for the continued use of
11. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 260 (introductory note to Part V).
12. Professor Ruder has given the following list of substantive areas covered by the duty of
loyalty:
self-dealing, dealings by a corporate parent with its subsidiaries, majority shareholder
injury to minority shareholders in corporate acquisition and reorganization transac-
tions, excessive compensation, use of corporate funds to perpetuate control, sale of
control at a premium, insider trading, corporate opportunities, competition by corpo-
rate officers and directors with their corporation, and fiduciary obligations in
bankruptcy.
David S. Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAW. 1383, 1386-
87 (1985). To this list could be added (at least) demand on directors and shareholders in share-
holder derivative actions, use of special litigation committees, indemnification of officers and direc-
tors, resistance to hostile takeovers, composition of the board of directors, settlement of derivative
actions, characterizations of claims as direct or derivative, the director's duty of good faith, and
the availability of the attorney-client privilege in derivative litigation.
13.
TABLE 1
1989 Fortune 25 Largest
U.S. Industrials
Name & State of
Incorporation 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88
General Motors (DE) 20(14/6) * x x
Ford Motor (DE) 17(9/8) * x
Exxon (NJ) 15(10/5) * SLC
X
IBM (NY) 18(15/3) * x
General Electric (NY) 19(16/3) * x x
Mobil (DE) 14(7/7) * x x x
Philip Morris (VA) 21(15/6) * x x
Chrysler (DE) 20(15/5) 2% x x x
E.I.DuPont (DE) 18(6/12) 28% x
Texaco (DE) 15(12/3) * x x x x x
Chevron (DE) 12(7/5) * x x
Amoco (IN) 14(7/7) * x x
continued . . .
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fiduciary duty of loyalty analysis in corporation law. There is no point at this
late date to continue to ask whether a corporate director is a trustee.', It has
already been explained that it is uninstructive to analogize a director to a
trustee, because the courts that make this analogy do not explain why some
similarities between directors and trustees are relevant and others are not." A
director is not a trustee, he is a fiduciary, and he does have a duty of loyalty.
The basic duty of loyalty analysis arises with the self-interested contract in
which the director or controlling stockholder enters into a transaction with the
corporation. The rules in the area of interested director contracts are poorly
understood and are in need of clarification. This Article will analyze the self-
interested contract by examining in order (1) the validity of such contracts at
common law; (2) the impact of the interested director statutes on the validity
of such contracts; (3) the issues of fairness and the burden of proof; (4) quali-
fications for the disinterested director; (5) proposals of the American Law In-
stitute; (6) fairness and the business judgment rule compared; and finally (7)
the application of these principles to the freezeout merger.
It will be seen that the application of fiduciary principles by the courts in
Shell Oil (DE) 12(6/6) 100% x x
Proctor & Gamble (OH) 19(11/8) * x x
Boeing (DE) 11(9/2) * x x x
Occidental Petroleum 17(8/9) 2% x x SLC x x x
(DE) x
United Technologies 12(11/1) 2% x x
(DE)
Eastman Kodak (NJ) 14(9/5) * x x
USX (DE) 15(10/5) * x x x x x
Dow Chemical (DE) 17(4/13) * x
Xerox (NY) 12(8/4) * x x x
Atlanta Richfield (DE) 15(9/6) * x
Pepsico (NC) 14(9/5) * x
RJR Nabisco Holdings 11(3/8) 97% x x x
(DE)
McDonnell Douglas (MD) 13(9/4) 15% x x
(1) Total Number of Directors (outside/inside). Inside directors include retired officers and con-
trolling shareholders
(2) Director and Officer Stockholdings (to next highest integer) (* Less than I%)
(3) Director transactions with the corporation
(4) More than 5% stockholders exist




14. See A.A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932).
15. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 805 (1983).
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this area has led not at all towards categorical prohibition but towards the
upholding of such contracts where there has been adequate disclosure and ap-
proval by disinterested corporate authority.
I. ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM: VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN A
CORPORATION AND ITS DIRECTORS
All current thinking on the corporate director's duty of loyalty appears to
start with the proposition, which seems now to be universally accepted, that
transactions between a director and his corporation at common law were gen-
erally voidable without regard to fairness." It is submitted that this proposi-
tion is completely erroneous.
Professor Marsh appears to have been the first to make the claim that self-
interested contracts were voidable regardless of the fairness of the transac-
tions. Twenty-six years ago, he stated in a much-cited article:
In 1880 it could have been stated with confidence that in the United
States the general rule was that any contract between a director and his
corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its sharehold-
ers, without regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction ...
Under this rule it mattered not the slightest that there was a majority of so-
called disinterested directors who approved the contract . . . .This rule ap-
plied not only to individual contracts with directors, but also to the situation
of interlocking directorates where even a minority of the boards were com-
mon to the two contracting corporations. 7
However, the general rule in 1880 was actually the opposite of that de-
scribed. Interested director contracts were not always voidable. One of the
leading treatises stated:
But the weight of authority and of reason appears to indicate that such a
contract would be valid. . . .There is no necessary impropriety in a con-
tract between a director and the corporation, if the latter is represented by
other agents. On the contrary, such contracts are, in many instances, the
natural result of circumstances, and are justified by the approved usages of
business men."
An earlier treatise of the time held to the same effect: "The managers or di-
16. See. e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 5.01 reporter's note at 270; EDWARD BROOSKY & M.
PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 3.01, at ch.3, p.1 (1984);
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 5.1 (1986).
17. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36-37 (1966). Because ex-
cerpts from this article are published in the leading text on corporate law, it is fair to say that
many lawyers begin their thinking on this subject here. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A.
EISENBERG. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 556-59 (6th ed. unabr. 1988).
18. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 527, at
494-95 (2d ed. 1886); see also SEWARD BRICE, A TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
477-87 (2d Amer. ed. 1880); JAMES H. PURDY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-




rectors of a corporation are not trustees of its property in such a sense, as to
disenable them from purchasing the property or stock belonging to it, with the
same effect as though they were not managers or directors." 9
In a much-cited decision of this era, Twin-Lick Oil v. Marbury,20 the
United States Supreme Court declined to consider whether a transaction be-
tween the corporation and a director could be set aside, holding that the plain-
tiff shareholder had waited too long to bring suit.2' However, the Supreme
Court stated clearly that interested director contracts were not necessarily
suspect:
While it is true that the defendant, as a director of the corporation, was
bound by all those rules of conscientious fairness which courts of equity
have imposed as the guides for dealing in such cases, it cannot be main-
tained that any rule forbids one director among several from loaning money
to the corporation when the money is needed, and the transaction is open,
and otherwise free from blame. No adjudged case has gone so far as this.
Such a doctrine, while it would afford little protection to the corporation
against actual fraud or oppression, would deprive it of the aid of those most
interested in giving aid judiciously, and best qualified to judge of the neces-
sity of that aid, and of the extent to which it may safely be given.22
In another case, while setting aside a related sale of corporate property, the
Supreme Court of Illinois upheld a loan to the corporation by one of its direc-
tors and the accompanying pledge of corporate assets, explaining: "We have
never known it questioned that a director or stockholder may trade with, bor-
row from or loan money to the company of which he is a member, on the same
terms and in like manner as other persons."23
Once we accept the fact that, according to the great weight of authority,
interested director transactions were never thought to be voidable without re-
gard to fairness, we are freed from the necessity of answering Professor
Marsh's perplexing question of why there was an unexplained change in legal
philosophy.2' If we review the early cases in light of agency and trust law
principles, we can also stop wondering why corporate law, as some critics
19. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS AGGREGATE 214 (2d ed. 1843).
20. 91 U.S. 587 (1875).
21. Id. at 593-94.
22. Id. at 589.
23. Harts v. Brown, 77 Ill. 226, 230-31 (1875); accord Combination Trust Co. v. Weed, 2 F.
24, 24 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1880) (contract with president); Duncomb v. New York, Housatonic, & N.
R.R., 88 N.Y. 1, 7 (1882) (same).
24. Marsh, supra note 17, at 40 ("One searches in vain in the decided cases for a reasoned
defense of this change."). The early twentieth-century authorities were clear on the general rule of
validity and did not note any change in the law on this subject. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE,
BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 123, at 388-89 (1927); 4 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2347, at 3599-3600 (1918); 13 AM. JUR. Corporations
§ 10005 (1938).
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would have it, does not follow the strict prohibitions of trust and agency law.2 5
In fact, the nineteenth-century cases did make the analogy to trust and
agency law, but there never was, and there is not now, any doctrine in either
agency26 or trust27 law that categorically prohibits transactions between the
fiduciary and the person represented; it is a matter of prohibiting the fiduciary
from standing on both sides of the transaction. The fiduciary cannot represent
both himself and his principal or beneficiary. Validation of the transaction
then requires (1) a full disclosure by the fiduciary of his conflict of interest
and any material information he may have about the transaction, and (2) in-
formed consent by or on behalf of the principal or beneficiary.28
The question of consent did not pose much of a problem in agency law,
since the principal was always the person in control of the activity by defini-
tion.2 9 In trust law, however, the trustee was the person in control, and the
beneficiaries assumed a presumptively subservient position, which complicated
the matter; also there arose questions not present in agency law, such as
whether consent might be given in advance in the deed of trust (the answer
was generally yes),30 whether consent might be given to one trustee by his
fellow trustees (no), 1 whether the consent of the beneficiaries had to be unani-
mous (yes), 2 and whether the chancery court itself might validate the transac-
tion (yes). 33
As applied to the corporation, the question of consent initially turned on
whether the consent of the board was sufficient or whether the consent of all or
some of the shareholders would be required. There was some conflict in the
early cases, but the general answer was that the consent of an informed board
would suffice. This raised the additional questions of what should be done if a
majority of the directors were interested, so that a disinterested quorum could
not be assembled, and what should be done if the interested director partici-
pated in the giving of consent by the board, whether or not his vote was
25. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 1434 (noting that relaxation of rules from trust and agency
law has been without explanation or justification); David M. Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Prop-
erty: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 184, 189 (1979)
("Case law has never satisfactorily explained the reasons for the divorce of corporate law from
trust principles.").
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389-390 (1958); Annotation, Rights and
Remedies of Principal Where Agent Professes To Sell Principal's Property Without Disclosing
that He Is the Purchaser, 62 A.L.R. 63 (1929).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 205-206, 216 (1959); Austin W. Scott,
The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARV. L. REV. 521, 565 (1936) (noting that validation re-
quires disclosure, consent, and fairness).
28. SHEPHERD, supra note 5 at 168-70; see Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991)
("The key to upholding an interested transaction is the approval of some neutral decision-making
body.").
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I (1958).
30. Scott, supra note 27, at 524.
31. Id. at 536.
32. Id. at 524.
33. Id. at 533.
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needed or his presence was needed to constitute a quorum.
If we examine the cases cited by Professor Marsh in support of his assertion
that interested director contracts were voidable in spite of fairness, we will see
that the cases were actually concerned with transactions in which the inter-
ested director was active in representing both sides of the deal.3 4 Three of the
cases involved the activities of the same man, Allen M. Sherman, a director,
member of the executive committee, and financial agent of the Cumberland
Coal and Iron Company. In one of these three cases, a New York Supreme
Court stated that an interested director transaction is voidable without regard
to fairness unless ratified by all of the stockholders, not the disinterested direc-
tors.35 This case is cited by two of the leading authorities earlier in this cen-
tury as illustrative of a minority view, 6 along with a New Jersey case also
cited by Professor Marsh.37
II. STATUTORY INTERVENTION INTO INTERESTED DIRECTOR CONTRACTS
Some of the early American cases 8 refer to the English statute on inter-
ested director contracts, sections 85 through 87 of the Companies Clauses
34. Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 651, 655 (1880) (directors authorizing unfair contract
were to profit personally from it); O'Conner Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 10 So.
290, 292 (Ala. 1891) (transactions between corporations under common control were not voidable
by creditors in absence of fraud); Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 7 So. 108, 109 (Ala. 1889)
(voiding transactions by controlled subsidiary with its parent); Nedry v. Vaile, 160 S.W. 880, 882
(Ark. 1913) (transactions between corporation and its president and principal stockholder were
not voidable by creditor in absence of fraud); New Blue Point Mining Co. v. Weissbein, 244 P.
325, 328 (Cal. 1926) (transaction authorized by two interested directors not subject to corporate
disaffirmance due to long delay in objection); Davis v. Rock Creek L. F. & M. Co., 55 Cal. 359,
364 (1880) (stating that the law does not permit a transaction where president and director exe-
cuted notes and mortgage in favor of a firm of which president was a member); Mallory v. Mal-
lory-Wheeler Co., 23 A. 708, 709 (Conn. 1891) (declining to enforce contract where majority of
board authorized contracts with themselves); European & N. Am. Ry. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277, 278-
79 (1871) (analyzing legality of a construction contract signed by the president and the director in
which president was personally interested); Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal & Iron
Co., 16 Md. 456, 474 (1860) (unfair contract was set aside where purchasing director actively
represented corporation in the sale); Pearson v. Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 537, 539 (1883) (en-
joining execution of transactions between controlled subsidiary and parent corporation); Munson
v. Syracuse, G. & C. Ry., 8 N.E. 355, 355 (N.Y. 1886) (declining to determine the legality of
participation by selling director in corporation's approval of purchase contract).
35. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553, 578 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859); accord
Metropolitan Elevated Ry. v. Manhattan Elevated Ry., 14 Abb. N. Cas. 103, 272 (N.Y. Ct. C.P.
1884).
36. See BALLANTINE, supra note 24, § 123, at 388-89 (discussing minority view); 4 FLETCHER,
supra note 24, § 2346, at 3596-99 (same).
37. Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 38 N.J.L. 505 (1875). The third Sherman case involved a
mortgage given by the Cumberland company to Mr. Sherman. There the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that Mr. Sherman had failed to show that he had given any consideration for the
mortgage, which therefore could not be enforced against the company. Cumberland Coal & Iron
Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 613 (1875).
38. See, e.g., Pearson v. Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 537, 547 (1883); U.S. Rolling Stock Co. v.
Atlantic & Great W. R.R., 34 Ohio St. 450, 464 (1878).
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Consolidation Act. 39 The English statute provided that no director was to be
interested in a contract with his corporation and that if he was so interested,
his office as director would become vacant. ° Apart from the statute, a con-
tract authorized by an interested director could not be enforced against the
corporation by the director." This early statute apparently did not serve as a
model for American legislatures.
A nineteenth-century West Virginia statute provided in relevant part:
No member of the board shall vote on a question in which he is interested
otherwise than as a stockholder, or be present at the board while the same is
being considered; but if his retiring from the board in such case reduce the
number present below a quorum, the question may nevertheless be decided
by those who remain.42 .
According to the Supreme Court of West Virginia, this statute modified the
rule ' that directors could not authorize a contract with a codirector, only the
shareholders." However, the court held that the effect of the statute was not
to insulate the contract from any attack but to leave open the right of credi-
tors to set aside the transaction for unfairness."5 The court noted that the obvi-
39. Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 16 (Eng.). The statute pro-
vided in relevant part:
LXXXV. No Person shall be capable of being a Director unless he be a Share-
holder, nor unless he be possessed of the prescribed Number, if any, of Shares; and no
Person holding an Office or Place of Trust or Profit under the Company, or interested
in any Contract with the Company, shall be capable of being a Director; and no
Director shall be capable of accepting any other Office or Place of Trust or Profit
under the Company, or of being interested in any Contract with the Company, during
the Time he shall be a Director.
LXXXVI. If any of the Directors at any Time subsequently to his Election accept
or continue to hold any other Office or Place of Trust or Profit under the Company, or
be either directly or indirectly concerned in any Contract with the Company, or par-
ticipate in any Manner in the Profits of any Work to be done for the Company, or if
such Director at any Time cease to be a Holder of the prescribed Number of Shares
in the Company, then and in any of the Cases aforesaid the Office of such Director
shall become vacant, and thenceforth he shall cease from voting or acting as a
Director.
LXXXVII. Provided always, that no Person being a Shareholder or Member of any
incorporated Joint Stock Company shall be disqualified or prevented from acting as
Director by reason of any Contract entered into between such Joint Stock Company
and the Company incorporated by the special Act; but no such Director, being a
Shareholder or Member of such Joint Stock Company, shall vote on any Question as
to any Contract with such Joint Stock Company.
Id.
40. Id.
41. Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros., 149 Rev. Rep. 32, 39 (H.L. 1854) (finding the contract
enforceable at law but voidable in equity).
42. 1863 W. Va. Acts 82, ch. 83, § 33.
43. Hope v. Valley City Salt Co., 25 W. Va. 789, 805 (1885) (citing the minority case of
Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859)).
44. Id. at 807.
45. Id.
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ous purpose of the statute was to allow a disinterested minority of the board to
act."'
A 1920 Rhode Island statute provided that an interested director contract
that was approved by disinterested directors could be set aside only for reasons
that would void a contract with a stranger.4
7
However, the best known of the statutes, and the one that served as a model
for modern statutes,"' was the 1931 California version.' 9 The new statute was
46. Id.
47. The text of the statute was as follows:
Validity of Contract by Corporation in Case of Interested or Interlocking Directors.
Sec. 21.-Any corporation may contract for any lawful purpose with one or more of
its directors or with any corporation having with it a common director or directors, if
the contract is entered into in good faith and is approved or ratified by a majority vote
at any meeting of its board of directors: Provided, that the contracting or common
director or directors shall not vote on the question and shall not be counted in ascer-
taining whether or not a quorum is present for this purpose at the meeting. A contract
made in compliance with the foregoing provisions shall be voidable by the corporation
complying with said provisions only in case it would be voidable if made with a
stranger.
1920 R.I. Pub. Laws 195-196, 1 1925, § 21, quoted in Matteson v. Wm. S. Sweet & Son, Inc.,
193 A. 171, 172 (R.I. 1937). In Matteson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the statu-
tory procedure was exclusive and that failure to follow the statute invalidated the resulting agree-
ment. Matteson, 193 A. at 174; see Kenneth B. Lane, Note, Corporations: Interlocking Director-
ates: Statutory Regulation of Dealings Between Corporations with Interlocking Directorates, 23
CORNELL LQ. 445 (1938) (discussing Matteson).
48. See Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors'
Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 201, 201
(1977).
49. 1931 Cal. Stat. 1777-1778, 862, § 311, as amended, 1933 Cal. Stat, 1369, 533, § 311
and reenacted, 1947 Cal. Stat. 2322-2323, T 1038, § 820. The statute provided as follows:
820. Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in good faith, and with a view to
the interests of the corporation. No contract or other transaction between a corpora-
tion and one or more of its directors, or between a corporation and any corporation,
firm, or association in which one or more of its directors are directors or are finan-
cially interested, is either void or voidable because such director or directors are pre-
sent at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes
or approves the contract or transaction, or because his or their votes are counted for
such purpose, if the circumstances specified in any of the following subdivisions exist:
(a) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or known
to the board of directors or committee and noted in the minutes, and the board or
committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith by
a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the vote or votes of such director or
directors.
(b) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or known
to the shareholders, and they approve or ratify the contract or transaction in good
faith by a majority vote or written consent of shareholders entitled to vote.
(c) The contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation at the
time it is authorized or approved.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which autho-
rizes, approves, or ratifies a contract or transaction.
1947 Cal. Stat. 2322-2323, 1038, § 820.
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intended to allow the interested director to be counted towards a quorum and
even to vote in favor of the transaction, as long as (1) there were sufficient
disinterested directors voting to authorize the transaction without his vote, or
(2) a majority of the informed shareholders approved the transaction, or (3)
the transaction was just and reasonable."' Professor Ballantine said it was the
view of a majority of the committee on corporations that interested director
contracts should be voidable only for unfairness and not because the interested
director was counted towards a quorum or had voted to approve the
transaction.5 1
The California statute introduced two new elements not present in the
Rhode Island or West Virginia statutes: (1) ratification by a committee of the
board, and (2) ratification by the shareholders. Committees of the board were
known to the law of corporations as authorized by statute, the corporate char-
ter or bylaws, or by implied authority, although it was not believed that the
board could delegate its entire authority to a committee. 52 With respect to
ratification by shareholders, the rule was, at common law, different from the
rule for directors: Shareholders who were interested in the transaction were
entitled to have their votes counted towards ratification although necessary to
the result.53 However, it was said to be the "better rule" that a majority share-
holder could not ratify his own contracts." ' At the same time, dummy direc-
tors who were dominated and controlled by an interested director were not
considered disinterested for the purpose of disinterested director ratification,
but the fact that a director had been nominated and elected by a majority
shareholder did not as such disqualify him from being disinterested. 55
A question left unanswered by the California statute was whether a transac-
tion could be validated by the vote of an interested shareholder under section
820(b) if the transaction was not just and reasonable. This question was an-
swered in the negative by a California appellate court in the well-known case
50. 1947 Cal. Stat. 2322-2323, 1038, § 820.
51. Henry W. Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CAL.
L. REV. 465, 475-76 (1931). For a discussion of the state of the law in California on this subject
at the time, see Robert E. Carp, Comment, Corporations: Effect of Directors' Adverse Interest or
Conflicting Duties to Invalidate Contracts: California Civil Code Section 311, 29 CAL. L. REV.
480 (1941); Owen B. Marron, Comment, Corporations: Effect upon Contracts of Adverse Interest
of Directors: Interlocking Directorates, 19 CAL. L. REV. 304 (1931); Recent Decisions, Corpora-
tions: Contracts: Effect upon Contracts of Adverse Interest of Directors, 21 CAL. L. REV. 64
(1932).
52. 3 FLETCHER. supra note 24, §§ 1951-1960, at 3144-53 (1917).
53. 4 id. § 2187, at 3393-94.
54. 4 id. § 2398, at 3650. In the case of Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 83 N.E. 434 (i11.
1907), the court stated that if it were a question of whether the majority shareholders had exer-
cised good judgment, a different rule might apply, but, in the case before the court, the corpora-
tion had purchased property from interested directors for a price much in excess of its value. Id.
at 441. This, said the court, was a fraud on the shareholders, which the majority could not ratify.
Id.
55. 4 FLETCHER, supra note 24, § 2355, at 3611 (citing Cowell v. McMillin, 177 F. 25, 43 (9th
Cir. 1910)).
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of Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.56 In Remillard, two individ-
uals owning sixty percent of the voting stock of one corporation caused the
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to enter into contracts with a
third corporation of which the two individuals owned all of the stock.57 Under
the contracts, the third corporation enjoyed substantial profits.58 The majority
shareholders argued that since they had approved the contracts in their capac-
ity as shareholders, section 820 was satisfied and it did not matter that the
contracts were unfair to the controlled corporation. 59 The minority forty-per-
cent shareholder sued the majority shareholders. The court set aside the con-
tracts,60 pointing out that the statute included language that " '[d]irectors and
officers shall exercise their powers in good faith, and with a view to the inter-
ests of the corporation.' "61 Therefore, it could not have been the intent of the
statute to allow a majority of the directors to mulct the minority
stockholders.62
The Remillard case is illustrative of a problem created by statutory inter-
vention into the interested director transaction. The common law solution had
been to allow interested director contracts if disinterested board approval had
been obtained after full disclosure, although there was an early minority view
that only the shareholders could validate such a transaction. The purpose of
the statutes had been to facilitate interested director transactions by overturn-
ing the minority decisions and making it clear that the board could act, but
also to allow a disinterested minority of the board to act if a quorum could not
be obtained, or to allow an interested majority of the board to act if the trans-
action was otherwise fair.
However, the result has been a lack of understanding in the cases as the
courts have had to decide whether the statute provides the exclusive method of
validating such contracts, whether compliance with the statute validates the
transaction, or whether the court must still find fairness to the corporation.
The remainder of this section will discuss some of the leading cases in this
area.
Delaware adopted a statutory provision in 1967 based on the California
model, but which introduced some new elements.6 3 In addition to the transac-
56. 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
57. Id. at 68-69.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 73.
60. Id. at 72-73.
61. Id. (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1947)).
62. Id. at 75.
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991). The statute in its present form reads as follows:
§ 144. Interested directors; quorum.
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and I or more of its directors
or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, associa-
tion, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors
or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason,
or solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of
the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because
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tion not being void or voidable because of participation or voting by the inter-
ested director, the Delaware version provided that it would not be void or void-
able because of the interest of the director itself."' The statute also borrowed
from the West Virginia version by allowing the transaction to be approved by
a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested direc-
tors are less than a quorum."
The same question as to the effect of approval by interested shareholders
under the statute was answered by the Delaware Supreme Court in the well-
known case of Fliegler v. Lawrence.66 There, the defendant directors and of-
ficers of Agau Mines, Inc., acquired, through a separate corporation that they
controlled, certain mining properties that they optioned to Agau Mines. 7 Sub-
sequently, Agau exercised the option to acquire the properties in exchange for
Agau stock, and this decision was approved by the Agau board and by a ma-
jority of the Agau stockholders." However, a majority of the approving share-
holder votes were cast by the defendants, and the Delaware Supreme Court
held that this interested shareholder approval did not relieve the defendants of
the burden of proving that the transaction was intrinsically fair to Agau."
There was one disinterested director on the board, and the defendants argued
that his approval at the board level validated the transaction, but the court did
not accept that argument since this director did not participate at the board
meeting where thie decision to exercise the option was made. 0
The Delaware law on this subject received a very strange interpretation by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Robert A. Wach-
his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the con-
tract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or
the committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the con-
tract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested
directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the con-
tract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to
vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good
faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time
it was authorized, approved, or ratified, by the board of directors, a commit-
tee or the shareholders.
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of
a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a committee which authorizes
the contract or transaction.
Id.
64. Id. § 144(a).
65. Id. § 144(a)(1).
66. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
67. Id. at 220.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 221.
70. Id. at 222 n.3.
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sler, Inc. v. Florafax International, Inc.," where a consulting agreement be-
tween Florafax and a corporation owned by one of its five directors and his
wife was set aside; this even though the contract was found to be substantively
fair to the corporation. 72 The contract had not been approved by the board of
Florafax; it had been signed, on behalf of Florafax, by its president and chief
executive officer with the approval of its chairman of the board and principal
shareholder.7 The statute therefore was inapplicable, but the court quite prop-
erly held that the statute was not intended as the exclusive method for validat-
ing interested director contracts.74 However, in a poorly reasoned opinion the
court then went on to hold that (1) acceptance of benefits under the contract
by Florafax would not be a sufficient ratification, although the Delaware
courts would apparently so hold;7" and (2) the contract could not be ratified by
the board but only by a majority of the Florafax shareholders.7 This latter
holding is a complete misinterpretation of the law on this subject and ignores
the pre-statute majority rule that the interested director contract can be ap-
proved by disinterested directors.
In fact, there was no need for any ratification of the contract since it had
been signed by the president and chief executive officer with the chairman's
approval. There is no requirement that every interested director transaction be
approved by the board if made in the ordinary course of business or if the
board has delegated authority to the president to make such contracts. 77 The
question is whether the corporation is represented by parties with adequate
authority other than the interested director, and that was clearly the case in
Wachsler. This decision is particularly offensive since the only reason the cor-
poration repudiated the contract was that the principal shareholder sold his
stock to a third party, who appointed a new board that disaffirmed the
contract.78
71. 778 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1985).
72. Id. at 551.
73. Id. at 548.
74. Id. at 551.
75. Id. at 552.
76. Id. at 552-53.
77. See Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212, 214 (Cal. 1985) (president and chairman
agreed to pay outside director $1.6 million finder's fee); PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 5.09, at 406-
07, § 5.09 cmt. at 407-18. The evidence in Wachsler showed that other Florafax directors were
receiving fees from the corporation under agreements that did not have board approval. Wachsler,
778 F.2d at 548.
78. Wachsler, 778 F.2d at 549. The old president was a member of the new board, and it would
have been appropriate if he had been held personally liable for breach of his warranty of author-
ity, but this question was not presented to the court. See Husky Indus. v. Craig Indus., 618
S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that agent may be personally liable where he
erroneously represents that he has authority to bind the principal). This sale of control stock
brings into play the considerations that underlay the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad, 417 U.S. 703 (1974). There the Court
held that a corporation could not sue its former parent corporation for improper self-dealing where
almost all of its stock was now held by a shareholder who was not a shareholder at the time of the
acts reclevant. Id. at 710-11.
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In the subsequent case of Marciano v. Nakash, the Delaware Supreme
Court clarified the law by holding that, indeed, the statute is not the exclusive
method of validating interested director transactions.8" In Marciano, one of
two fifty-percent shareholders had made loans totaling $2.5 million to the cor-
poration without board or shareholder approval, the board and the sharehold-
ers having been evenly divided. 81 Because the statute was not applicable, the
court held that the shareholder making the loans had the burden of proving
that the transaction was intrinsically fair to the corporation, which it found to
have been met. 82 The court noted in dicta that the effect of the statute where
the transaction is approved by disinterested directors or disinterested share-
holders who are in either case fully informed is to shift the burden of proof to
the plaintiff to prove gift or waste of corporate assets.88 On the other hand, if
the approval is not fully informed, the burden remains on the defendant to
prove intrinsic fairness. 84
Another curious exercise in statutory interpretation is met in Scott v. Multi-
Amp Corp.,85 which concerns the New Jersey statute dealing with validation
of interested director contracts.86 The New Jersey statute was adopted first in
1968 and is based substantially on the California statute. In Scott, the court
was faced with a challenge to a proposal by directors and controlling share-
holders, owning over twenty percent of the outstanding stock in Multi-Amp
Corporation, to sell all the assets and business of Multi-Amp to a second cor-
poration of which they owned all the stock.8" A contract for the sale had been
approved by the Multi-Amp board, subject to the approval of the sale by
Multi-Amp shareholders. 88 Citing an article by Carlos L. Israels of the New
York Bar, the court held that, despite the use of the disjunctive "or" in the
statute, an interested director transaction must pass muster under each of the
three subdivisions of the New Jersey statute: (1) approval by disinterested di-
rectors, (2) approval by shareholders, and (3) fairness.88 This indefensible in-
terpretation of the statute was rejected by the New Jersey legislature in
1988,90 but the accompanying Commissioners' Comment makes it clear that
the statute is not intended to provide a procedure to validate interested direc-
tor contracts but to reverse the former common law rule of voidability solely
79. 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987).
80. Id. at 403.
81. Id. at 401.
82. Id. at 407.
83. Id. at 405 n.3.
84. Id.
85. 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (West 1969).
87. Scott, 386 F. Supp. at 52.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 67 (citing Carlos L. Israels, The Corporate Triangle--Some Comparative Aspects of
the New Jersey, New York, and Delaware Statutes, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 615, 627-28 (1969)
(discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8)).
90. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (West Supp. 1991).
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on account of the conflict.91 The court in Scott also held that compliance with
the statute did not relieve the interested director from the burden of proving
the fairness of the contract to the corporation. 92
In summary, the treatment of the statutes by the courts has been uneven.
There is agreement only on the principal questions: (1) that approval of the
shareholders is not required for validation of the transaction; (2) that the con-
tract is not voidable without regard to fairness if the statutory procedure is
followed; and (3) that if approval at the board or shareholder level has vali-
dated the contract only by vote of interested parties, the court must still find
fairness in the transaction. The two issues of what is meant by fairness in the
interested director context and who has the burden of proof for showing fair-
ness require further understanding.
III. FAIRNESS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN INTERESTED
DIRECTOR CONTRACTS
In agency law, an agent who is charged with a breach of the duty of loyalty,
as by having an undisclosed conflict of interest, has the burden of proving that
he did not have a conflict; if the agent is charged with a breach of the duty of
care, the plaintiff has the burden to prove the breach."' An agent who acts as
an adverse party with the knowledge of the principal also has a duty to deal
fairly with the principal and to disclose all material facts to the principal; the
agent also has the burden of proof as to compliance with these duties.94 On the
issue of fair dealing, this at a minimum includes the agent's duty of disclosure
and not driving a hard bargain through the use of his position. If the principal
is independent and self-reliant, the fact that the agent has got the better of the
deal will not be a breach of duty so long as there is full disclosure. However, if
the principal is in a dependent position and not well advised by other compe-
tent persons, or relies on the agent for guidance, the agent may have to prove
substantive fairness of the transaction as well as full disclosure. 95
Similarly, in trust law, a trustee who is charged with a breach of the duty of
loyalty-as in a self-dealing transaction-has the burden of proving that his
actions were not a breach of trust.96 In dealing with the beneficiary on the
91. Id. (Commissioners' Comment, 1988 Amendments). New Jersey did follow the minority
rule at one time. See Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 38 N.J.L. 505 (1875). The Stewart court
actually upheld the challenged contract as valid against third parties such as the plaintiff, so this
discussion was really dictum. Id. at 524.
92. Scott, 386 F. Supp. at 68 ("[A] fiduciary who engages in self-dealing must endure the
burden of proving that a challenged transaction is fair and equitable.").
93. Lindland v. United Business Invs., 693 P.2d 20, 25 (Or. 1984) ("The party claiming a
breach of fiduciary duty must plead and prove the breach, and must show that the breach caused
an identifiable loss or resulted in injury to the party."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
389 cmt. e (1958) ("[T]he burden of proof is upon the agent to show that he has satisfied the
duties required by the rules stated in this section.").
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 & cmt. g (1958).
95. Id. § 390 & cmt. c.
96. GEORGE G. BOGERT. THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 544 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
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trustee's own account, the trustee must deal fairly and communicate all mate-
rial facts about the transaction of which the trustee is aware.9" Even where the
beneficiary has consented to the adverse interest of the trustee, the transaction
may be avoided if it is not "fair and reasonable." 9 However, where the benefi-
ciary is independent and represented by other advisers, this does not mean that
the transaction will be set aside just because the trustee got the better of the
bargain."
In the corporation cases before the advent of the modern interested director
statutes, these general fiduciary principles were applied to self-dealing transac-
tions where the corporation was represented by disinterested officers. Thus, in
the case of interested director contracts or contracts between corporations with
common directors, the burden of proof was generally on the defendant to
prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable and that appropriate dis-
closure had been made. 00 Unfairness would exist where there was gross inade-
quacy of price; however, if disinterested representatives acted for the corpora-
tion, mere inadequacy of price would not establish unfairness where
appropriate disclosure was made.' 0
Nonetheless, there has been a divergence of views on the question of burden
of proof. Writing in 1946, Professor Ballantine stated that some jurisdictions
placed the burden on the plaintiff minority shareholder."' The effect of the
interested director statutes has not been dispositive where the burden of proof
is not settled in the statute itself. Professor Ballantine stated that the Califor-
nia statute in 1931 did not address the question of the burden of proof,103 and
the California courts held, without discussion, that it remained with the inter-
ested director.104
The California statute was amended in 1977 to distinguish between material
financially interested director transactions and transactions between companies
with common directors where no director material financial interest is present.
The burden of proof that the transaction is just and reasonable is placed on
the interested director only in the situation where the financial interest trans-
action is not approved by disinterested shareholders or disinterested directors.
However, in the case of transactions approved by disinterested directors, the
transaction still must be just and reasonable, but the burden is on the plaintiff
to prove that it is not. 105
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
98. Id. § 216(3).
99. SHEPHERD. supra note 5, at 169.
100. 4 FLETCHER, supra note 24, § 2337, at 3586-87, § 2389, at 3643.
101. 4 id. § 2335, at 3583-86.
102. HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS, § 70 (rev. ed. 1946); see also 3
FLETCHER. supra note 24, § 921, at 513-20 (perm. ed. 1986).
103. Ballantine, supra note 51, at 476.
104. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 75 (Cal. Ct. App.
1952) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)).
105. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1990); see Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212, 220
(Cal. 1985) (president and chairman of the board agreed to pay outside director $1.6 million
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Before the New York statute was amended in 1971 to place the burden of
proof on the interested director in cases where the contract was not approved
by disinterested directors or the shareholders after full disclosure, it was un-
clear whether the statute was intended to change the common law rule that
the burden of proof was on the interested director.106
Delaware courts began to place the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the
transaction amounted to corporate waste where there had been approval of the
transaction by disinterested directors or shareholders even before the Delaware
statute.0 7 Now it appears clear that in Delaware the burden to prove intrinsic
fairness is on the controlling stockholder where there is no disinterested direc-
tor or stockholder approval,' 0 8 but the burden is on the plaintiff to prove waste
where there is such approval.' 09
As used by the Delaware Supreme Court, the terms "entire fairness," "in-
herent fairness," and "intrinsic fairness" have the same meaning: that under
all the circumstances the transaction would have recommended itself to an
independent board of directors that was acting in good faith and had the best
interests of the corporation in mind." 0 By contrast, the term "corporate
waste," when applied to actions by directors or shareholders, refers to deci-
sions that fall outside the business judgment rule"' and that are of such na-
finder's fee; burden placed on director to prove agreement fair and reasonable, but statute not
cited).
106. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1986); Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d
764, 768-70 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing burden of proof to be placed on shareholder attacking
corporate transactions where business judgment rule is applied); Clair M. Dickerson, Interested
Directors of New York Corporations and the Burden of Proof 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 91;
Lauren B. Homer, Note, The Status of the Fairness Test Under Section 713 of the New York
Business Corporation Law, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1156 (1976) (calling for narrow interpretation of §
713).
107. Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971) (holding that the business judgment
rule is applicable to decision by disinterested directors to buy properties from 46% controlling
shareholder); accord Weiss v. Kay Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F.2d 1259, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(holding that plaintiff had the burden of proving bad faith or abuse of discretion amounting to
legal waste where no interested director had voted on the relevant transaction).
108. Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 406-07 (Del.) (parent-subsidi-
ary transactions), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 853 (1988); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d
107, 110 (Del. 1952) (parent-subsidiary merger).
109. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984).
110. Summa, 540 A.2d at 407; Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 224-25 (Del. 1976); Kee-
nan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. 1938); see also Sterling, 93 A.2d at 110. The same test
has been applied by the United States Supreme Court. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07
(1939) ("[Tlhe essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction
carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain."); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590, 599 (1921) (requiring full adequacy of consideration).
I l. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-17 (Del. 1984). The American Law Institute seems
to have come around to this point of view. See Discussion of Principles of Corporate Governance,
67 AL.I. PROC. 178 (1990) [hereinafter ALl Discussion].
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ture that no person of ordinarily sound business judgment would view them as
a fair exchange. " 2
IV. QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE DISINTERESTED
AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
Since approval of interested director transactions by disinterested directors
substantially affects both the burden of proof and the standard of review, it is
important to understand what is meant by a disinterested director.
It has been the contention of many commentators that truly disinterested
directors do not exist in publicly held companies because all directors are se-
lected by and owe their position and perquisites of office to the controlling
shareholder or chief executive officer. Thus, Professor Marsh's conclusion was
that current rules do little or nothing to inhibit conflicts of interest, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should be amended to prohibit affiliated-per-
son transactions subject to exemptions to be granted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. " ' This proposal was more recently echoed by Dean
Clark." 4 Such calls for categorical prohibition" are not likely to be heeded
by the legislatures and have been largely ignored by the courts.
However, the outside or independent director has been much in vogue for
publicly held companies at least since the 1970s and is required for registered
investment companies by federal statute" 6 and for other publicly held corpo-
rations by rules of the national securities exchanges and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers." 7 This development was called for not only by aca-
demicians" 8 but also by groups such as the Business Roundtable."
With the increasing activism of institutional investors, who collectively hold
a majority of stock in the large publicly held corporations, the trend towards a
112. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979) (quoting Kaufman v. Schreenberg,
91 A.2d 786, 791 (Del. Ch. 1952)); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952);
accord Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (App. Div. 1982).
113. Marsh, supra note 17, at 73-75.
114. CLARK. supra note 16, § 5.4.3; cf Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A New Look at
Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1022-24 (1981) (advocating a categorical prohi-
bition against outside business activities by corporate officers). The New York Stock Exchange
has had for many years rules regarding conflict of interest transactions, which it modified in 1984
to place primary responsibility on listed companies and their audit committees. See In re New
York Stock Exch., Exchange Act Release No. 20,767, 1984 SEC LEXIS 1985 (March 20, 1984);
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 307.00 (1983).
115. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597, 622-28 (1982).
116. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1988).
117. See Midwest Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-24939, 1987 SEC LEXIS
3644 (Sept. 24, 1987); NASD MANUAL 1812 (CCH 1967).
118. See Noyes E. Leech & Robert H. Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799 (1976).
119. Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Direc-
tors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978).
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majority of independent directors on the board is accelerating. 2 0 The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission staff has refused to opine that shareholder pro-
posals to amend company bylaws to require a majority of independent direc-
tors may properly be excluded from management's proxy statement, 1 2 and the
Dow Chemical Company, for example, included such a proposal in the proxy
material for its 1991 annual meeting of stockholders.12 Bills were introduced
in both houses of Congress on June 4, 1991, to amend the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to allow holders of not less than three percent or $1 million in
market value of the voting equity securities of an issuer to nominate in man-
agement's proxy statement persons for election to the board.123
The argument that, because of structural bias, actions by disinterested di-
rectors in interested director transactions should be ignored as being of no
legal consequence1 2' has not been accepted by the courts. Dismissing a charge
that directors were not disinterested because they were nominated and elected
at the behest of the interested forty-seven percent controlling shareholder, the
Delaware Supreme Court said simply: "That is the usual way a person be-
comes a corporate director."'' 25 In that case, the transaction under attack was
a board-approved consulting agreement with the controlling shareholder, a
seventy-five-year-old executive who was allegedly required to perform little or
no services for his substantial salary, bonus, and interest-free loans.'2 6 As to
120. Timothy D. Schellhardt, More Directors Are Recruited from Outside. WALL ST. J.. Mar.
20, 1991, at B 1; Institutional Investors Set High Priority on Obtaining Majorities of Independent
Directors, BNA CORP. COUNS. WKLY., Mar. 6, 1991, at 7-8; see Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (detail-
ing the rise and impact of institutional investors).
121. Dow Chem. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 391 (Mar. 7, 1991).
122. NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT OF THE Dow CHEMICAL COM-
PANY 30 (March 20, 1991). The text of the proposal reads as follows:
RESOLVED: That the shareholders of The Dow Chemical Company assembled in
annual meeting in person and by proxy, hereby request that the By-Laws be amended
to provide that the Board of Directors shall consist of a majority of independent direc-
tors. For these purposes, the definition of independent director shall mean a director
who:
-has not been employed by the corporation or an affiliate in an executive capacity
within the last five years;
-is not, and is not a member of a company or firm that is, one of the corporation's
paid advisors or consultants;
-is not employed by a significant customer or supplier;
-has no personal services contract with the corporation;
-is not employed by a foundation or university that receives significant grants or
endowments from the corporation; and,
-is not a relative of the management of the corporation.
Id. Delaware law permits such provisions to be drafted into corporation bylaws. See Stroud v.
Milliken Enters., 585 A.2d 1306 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed, 552 A.2d 476 (Del. 1989).
123. S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S6999 (1991).
124. Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1894, 1902-08 (1983).
125. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
126. Id. at 808-09.
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what would make the other directors interested for purposes of excusing a
demand on the board in this derivative shareholder's action, the court held
that director interest requires either a conflict of interest or a personal finan-
cial benefit from the transaction. 2 ' On remand, the plaintiff amended his
complaint, and the court of chancery held that new allegations excused de-
mand on the board.1"8 The new allegations were that the consulting agreement
was for a grossly inadequate consideration and really intended to compensate
the controlling shareholder for losses under an unrelated agreement with an-
other corporation, of which seven of the board members were also directors,
thereby creating both a conflict of interest and sufficient allegations of
waste.
129
It has been questioned whether the business judgment rule can ever be ap-
plied to transactions between a majority shareholder and the corporation.130
To be sure, the courts have applied the intrinsic fairness test to such transac-
tions where there was no disinterested director or shareholder approval.1 31
However, the business judgment rule has been applied to these transactions
where the terms of the transaction were not set by the majority shareholder.132
There is a difference between approval of the transaction by the interested
shareholder and approval by disinterested directors of the controlled corpora-
tion. Of course, if the directors are in fact dominated by the majority share-
holder, they are not disinterested." 33 However, it has been held that allegations
that the interested party dominated and controlled the board through his own-
ership of a majority of the voting stock were insufficient to impugn the integ-
rity and independence of the directors." 4 The reason for this was expressed
very simply: "Directors may be elected by the holder of a majority of the stock
of a corporation and yet be free agents and honest men.'3
127. Id. at 812; accord Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (divided loyalties or
personal financial benefit).
128. Lewis v. Aronson, C.A. No. 6919, 1985 WL 11553 (Del. Ch. May 1, 1985).
129. Lewis v. Aronson, C.A. No. 6919, 1985 WL 21141 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1985).
130. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN. DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS &
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.9, at 4-215 to 4-216 (2d ed. 1990); Andrew G.T. Moore, The "In-
terested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 674, 675 (1979).
131. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 223-24 (Del. 1976) (selling developed corporate op-
portunity to the corporation); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (breach
of contract to purchase oil).
132. Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970) (corporate parent's duty to
share oil import allocation with subsidiary); see Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720 (discussing Getty); cf.
Case v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 204 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that the allocation of tax benefits
under consolidated returns should not be interfered with, absent an abuse of power).
133. See Kells-Murphy v. McNiff, C.A. No. 11609, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127 (July 12, 1991);
3 FLETCHER, supra note 24, § 939, at 556-58 (perm. ed. 1986).
134. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 605-06 (Del. 1948); see Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (holding that majority stock ownership does not destroy
the presumption of director independence and good faith in demand-on-board context).
135. Carson v. Allegany Window Glass Co., 189 F. 791, 799 (C.C.D. Del. 1911).
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V. PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Corporate Governance Project has been an ambitious and controversial
undertaking since its beginning in 1978, and it is not yet completed. The cur-
rent draft of the ALI Principles is over 750 pages long. 136 As the title indi-
cates, it is not a restatement of existing law in the traditional ALI format, nor
is it really an analysis of the combined statutory and common law of corpora-
tions as it has developed and currently exists. It is rather a series of recom-
mendations of a largely legislative nature that the Institute proposes for adop-
tion mostly through judicial action to replace the system we now have. As
such, it should be welcomed for the insight it brings to difficult areas of the
law of corporations. However, it also should be treated with caution since it
represents the product of neither judicial nor legislative reaction to specific
problems arising from real-world fact patterns.
Like every other modern authority, the treatment of director self-dealing
seemingly rests at every point on Professor Marsh's conclusion that such activ-
ity was prohibited at common law, without regard to any concepts of fairness
or unfairness.' 3 7 It simply colors the whole treatment of the problem to take
that erroneous view as a point of beginning, as if it represented an Edenic
situation from which we have inexplicably strayed and to which we should
return, if only we could. It is proposed, therefore, that we should take as our
corrected point of beginning the proposition that interested director transac-
tions are now and always were proper and lawful if structured so that indepen-
dent and disinterested informed approval is combined with good faith behavior
of the interested director. This will allow us to focus on the real problem of
ensuring in each case the proper disclosure and informed consent.
Part V of the ALI Principles is now entitled "Duty of Fair Dealing" (for-
merly "Duty of Loyalty"), and in the space of 240 pages it deals with some
specific applications of the duty of loyalty of corporate directors, officers, and
controlling shareholders: (1) transactions with the corporation; (2) compensa-
tion; (3) use of corporate property, position, or information; (4) taking of cor-
porate opportunity; (5) competition with the corporation; and (6) sale of con-
trol. The subjects of tender offers and freezeout mergers are treated elsewhere.
The definitions in Part I of the ALI Principles always must be kept in mind.
For instance, the definition of "Disinterested Directors"1 8 introduces a discor-
dant note at the outset by refusing to give any effect to approval by a single
136. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.
137. See, e.g., id. § 5.01 reporter's note at 270, § 5.02 cmt. at 275, § 5.02(a)(2)(A) cmt. at
285, § 5.02 reporter's note at 300.
138. Section 1.10 defines this term as follows:
A provision that gives a specified effect to action by "disinterested directors" re-
quires the affirmative vote of a majority, but not less than two, of the directors on the
board or an appropriate committee who are not interested (§ 1.18) in the transaction
in question.
Id. § 1.10, at 19.
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disinterested director even if there is only one on the board. This approach
ignores existing case law'3 9 and statutory law"" and has been rejected by at
least one court. 4 '
The structure of Part V of Principles discloses that a series of very debata-
ble value judgments has been made by the drafters that betrays the ambiva-
lence that has always prevailed in this area. Thus, on the most basic question
of what standard will be applied to an interested director transaction where
there has been informed and disinterested director approval, Principles refuses
to give business judgment rule protection to the decision.14 2 Instead, a new and
judicially untested "could reasonably have concluded" standard is created,'43
which is more rigorous than the business judgment rule'" but not so rigorous
as the intrinsic fairness rule (retitled as a simple fairness standard).4 Then it
is made clear that the new "could reasonably have concluded" standard is
available only if the disinterested director approval is given in advance of the
transaction, another value judgment unsupported by authority.' 4 Finally, the
new standard is only applied to interested director transactions involving some-
thing other than compensation, corporate opportunities, competition with the
corporation and other subjects dealt with separately.
The reporter's note to section 5.02 offers as a defense to the new standard
the fact that the Delaware courts have only "indicated in dictum"'14 that the
business judgment rule applies where disinterested director approval has been
obtained. This is not so. The Delaware Court of Chancery in the leading case
of Puma v. Marriott4 1 specifically held some time ago that the business judg-
ment rule and not the fairness rule is applicable to the decision of disinterested
directors in an interested director/controlling shareholder transaction. 4 9 The
139. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 1984); Lewis
v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 971 (Del. Ch. 1985) (holding that conclusions of a one-person special
litigation committee would be acceptable if the committee is independent, acts in good faith, and
shows a reasonable basis for its conclusions), appeal denied sub nom. Fuqua Indus. v. Lewis, 504
A.2d 571 (Del. 1986).
140. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991) (requiring only one member for board of
directors or committee).
141. Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58-59 (Mass. 1990) (holding that one director on special
litigation committee is sufficient, but number of directors will be considered in determining
independence).
142. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 5.02(a)(2)(B), at 273 ("[D]isinterested directors . . . could
reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time of such
authorization.").
143. Id. § 5.02 cmt. at 275 (new in its articulation).
144. Id. § 5.02(a)(2) cmt. at 283.
145. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(A) & cmt. at 288; see id. § 5.02(a)(2)(A) cmt. at 284 (asserting that
"intrinsic," "inherent," or "entire" fairness as a standard offers insufficient analytical guidance).
146. Id. § 5.02 cmt. at 276 (distinguishing "based on principle and policy rather than on ex-
isting statutes or decisions").
147. Id. § 5.02 reporter's note at 302.
148. 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
149. Id. at 696. The court was clearly referring to the independent director action. Although
the transaction also was approved by the Marriott shareholders, the defendants owned 46 % of the
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Delaware Supreme Court cited Puma with approval in the leading case of
Aronson v. Lewis160 in holding that the business judgment rule would come
into play in an interested director/controlling shareholder transaction (there
compensation) both in resolving demand futility and as a defense to the merits
of the suit."' Finally, in the more recent case of Grobow v. Perot, 52 involving
the $745 million buyback by General Motors of the stock of director H. Ross
Perot, the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear that the directors' decision
there was protected by the business judgment rule.' 58
The new "could reasonably have concluded" standard is related to another
very questionable conclusion reached earlier in Principles that the business
judgment rule gives protection to all "rational" business decisions, not just to
"reasonable" business decisions and that this distinction is supported by the
cases and gives much greater protection to the board.'54 The earliest case cited
by Principles for the "rational" judgment terminology is Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien,' 5 but, in applying this test to the question at hand, the court there
also said the plaintiff must prove the decision was not "reasonable." ' "' Finally,
in the same case, the Delaware Supreme Court also said that conduct falling
outside the business judgment rule must amount to "waste.' '157
Principles is thus seen to use rational, reasonable, and waste as three dis-
tinct tests in Part V when the fact is that they are all the same standard.' 5 8
The Institute has recently acknowledged that the "waste" and "business judg-
ment rule" standards are the same, and it plans to revise Principles to reflect
stock. Id. For a critical view of Part V of Principles, see generally Charles Hansen et al., The
Role of Disinterested Directors in "Conflict" Transactions: The ALI Corporate Governance Pro-
ject and Existing Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1990).
150. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
151. Id.
152. 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).
153. Id. at 189-91 ("The law of Delaware is well established that, in the absence of evidence of
fraud or unfairness, a corporation's repurchase of its capital stock at a premium over market from
a dissident shareholder is entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule."); see also
Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 206 (Del. 1991) ("(A] plaintiff in a demand futility case must
plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt as to the 'soundness' of the challenged
transaction sufficient to rebut the presumption that the business judgment rule attaches to the
transaction.").
154. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 4.01(c)(3) & cmt. at 181 (noting that a director's good faith
business judgments are protected if "he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation").
155. See id. § 4.01(c) cmt. at 232 (stating that "decisions will not be disturbed if they can be
attributed to any 'rational business purpose.' " (quoting Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971))).
156. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (plaintiff must "meet his
burden of proving that a dividend cannot be grounded on any reasonable business objective").
157. Id. at 722 (finding motives immaterial "unless the plaintiff can show that the dividend
payments resulted from improper motives and amounted to waste").
158. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Care: Riddles Wisely
Expounded. 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 923 (1990).
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this fact.' 9
It should be emphasized that Part V is deliberately structured to deal only
with pecuniary interest self-dealing and not other director conflicts of interest,
and it does not use the term "duty of loyalty" to refer to director pecuniary
interest self-dealing.' The standard of conduct for the disinterested director
acting in a conflict situation is provided only by Part IV (Duty of Care and
Business Judgment Rule) and not Part V.1'1
The basic, self-interested director transaction, then, is governed by a com-
plex formula. The transaction is upheld if (1) conflict disclosure is made, and
(2) (A) the transaction is fair, or (B) it is authorized in advance by disinter-
ested directors and they could reasonably have concluded it was fair, or (C) it
is authorized or ratified by disinterested shareholders and does not constitute
waste. The burden of proof is on the person challenging the transaction only
where there is informed approval by disinterested shareholders or prior in-
formed approval by disinterested directors. 69
This formula is not applied to compensation decisions. In the case of com-
pensation of directors who are also senior executives, the transaction is upheld
if the compensation is (1) fair, or (2) authorized or ratified by disinterested
directors and the business judgment rule is satisfied, or (3) authorized or rati-
fied .by disinterested shareholders and does not constitute waste. The burden of
proof is on the person challenging the transaction unless there was no disinter-
ested director or shareholder approval."' This standard is specifically applica-
ble to the controversial area of golden parachute compensation arrangements
under which lucrative severance payments are made to corporate executives
following voluntary or involuntary separation from employment after a take-
over. 6' At the present time, the issues of management compensation in gen-
eral 65 and golden parachutes in particular'66 are as controversial as any sub-
ject in corporate governance. In any event, whether one finds multimillion
dollar golden parachutes more or less offensive than, say, the $90 million mu-
seum built by Occidental Petroleum Corporation to house the art collection of
its chief executive officer, Armand Hammer, 67 may be a matter of personal
taste. Under existing law, the business judgment rule applies to the decisions
159. ALl Discussion, supra note 111, at 178.
160. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 260 (introductory note to Part V).
161. Id. at 259 (introductory note to Part V).
162. Id. § 5.02, at 273-74.
163. Id. § 5.03, at 312-13.
164. Id. § 5.03 cmt. at 317, § 6.02 cmt. at 554.
165. See the statement accompanying the introduction of the Corporate Pay Responsibility
Act, S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S6997-99 (1991), and Joann S. Lublin,
Highly Paid Chiefs Earn Criticism, Too, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1991, at B.
166. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, "Golden Parachute" Defense to Hostile Corporate Take-
over, 66 A.L.R.4TH 138 (1988); Transamerica Corp., SEC Staff Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 46 (Jan. 10, 1990) (shareholder resolution recommending prohibition against golden
parachutes may not be omitted from management's proxy statement).
167. Frederick Rose, Hammer Museum Marked by Absence of Occidental Name, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 21, 1990, at C9.
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of independent directors in the golden parachute case"' as well as in the mu-
seum situation.1 69
Yet another formula is applied to corporate opportunity transactions, which
are business activity opportunities that as between corporate directors and of-
ficers and the corporation rightfully belong to the corporation.17 0 These trans-
actions by directors who are also senior executives are upheld if (1) the oppor-
tunity is first offered to the corporation and conflict disclosure is made and (2)
the opportunity is rejected by the corporation and the rejection (A) is fair, or
(B) is authorized in advance by disinterested directors and the business judg-
ment rule is satisfied, or (C) is authorized or ratified by disinterested share-
holders and does not constitute waste. 17  As in section 5.02, the burden of
proof is on the person challenging the transaction only where there is informed
approval by disinterested shareholders or prior informed approval by disinter-
ested directors.
Here is a trap for the unwary, again unsupported by any authority. If the
opportunity is not first offered to the corporation, the director cannot later
defend on the grounds that his failure to offer was fair. 172 He cannot, for in-
stance, argue that he believed in good faith that the opportunity was not a
corporate opportunity or that the corporation was not in a position to take the
opportunity. 1' 7  It is inappropriate for the reporter to cite the recent case of
Klinicki v. Lundgren 1 4 as authority for this last proposition, because that case
cited the then-current draft of Principles of Corporate Governance as author-
ity for its decision. 75 The only recourse for the director in this situation is to
procure rejection of the opportunity after the fact, which may not be feasible
once the matter is in litigation. " 6
VI. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND ENTIRE FAIRNESS
STANDARDS COMPARED
The two standards that have been used in the self-dealing cases are the
business judgment standard and the entire fairness standard. At the outset, it
168. See Worth v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc., 540 N.E.2d 249, 250 (Ohio 1989) (applying
business judgment rule to directors' decision to enter into a golden parachute contract with an
employee); Drew H. Campbell, Note, Golden Parachutes: Common Sense from the Common
Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 279 (1990) (comparing various court analyses in golden parachute chal-
lenge suits).
169. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (approving settlement, noting that
business judgment rule would protect decision of independent directors to build museum).
170. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 5.05, at 363-65; see Annotation, Fairness to Corporation
Where "Corporate Opportunity" Is Allegedly Usurped by Officer or Director, 17 A.L.R.4TH 479
(1982).
171. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 5.05, at 363-65.
172. Id. § 5.05(a) cmt. at 369, § 5.05(c) cmt. at 378-79.
173. Id. § 5.05 reporter's note at 384.
174. Id. § 5.05 reporter's note at 384 (citing Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985)).
175. Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906, 919-20 (Or. 1985).
176. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 5.05(e), at 365.
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should be said again that there is no difference between the "fairness" stan-
dard,1 77 the "intrinsic" fairness standard,7 8 the "entire" fairness standard,"7 "
and the "inherent" fairness standard.18 They are all the same standard:
fairness.
The Delaware Court of Chancery said recently that the significant differ-
ence between the fairness and business judgment tests is who has the burden
of proof.' To be sure, at least in Delaware the burden is on the interested
director or controlling shareholder to prove entire fairness where that test is
used, and the burden is on the minority shareholder challenging the transac-
tion to prove waste where disinterested and informed approval has been made,
but the standard of review has not otherwise been assumed to be the same.18 2
The business judgment rule has been defined to exclude only decisions involv-
ing waste, that is, transactions that no person of ordinarily sound business
judgment would believe were fair.' 83 The entire fairness test has been held to
require the fiduciary to prove that the outcome of the transaction, had it been
approved by an independent board of directors, would have been the same. 8
The Delaware Supreme Court has compared the two standards using the
following language:
Where the directors have represented both themselves and the corpora-
tion, and where there was no ratification by stockholders, and the action is
thereupon duly challenged, the court will usually have no choice but to em-
ploy its own judgment in deciding the perhaps very close and troublesome
questions as to whether the evidence shows that the directors in fact used
the utmost good faith and the most scrupulous fairness. Where there was
stockholder ratification, however, the court will look into the transaction
only far enough to see whether the terms are so unequal as to amount to
waste, or whether, on the other hand, the question is such a close one as to
call for the exercise of what is commonly called "business judgment." In the
former case the court will reverse the decision of the stockholders; in the
latter it will not. 186
The business judgment rule is intentionally tolerant of errors of judgment;
177. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 926 (Del. 1956).
178. Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 405 (Del.), cert. denied. 488
U.S. 853 (1988); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971).
179. Summa, 540 A.2d at 406; Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del.
1952); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. 1938) (citing Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921)).
180. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57,
58 (Del. 1952).
181. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal denied sub nom. Fuqua In-
dus. v. Lewis, 504 A.2d 571 (Del. 1986).
182. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
183. Gottlieb. 91 A.2d at 58.
184. Summa, 540 A.2d at 407.
185. Gottlieb, 91 A.2d at 58.
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in fact that is its original and primary purpose. It might be said, then, that the
business judgment rule requires only a showing that a reasonably prudent di-
rector could have made such a judgment (a possibility), while the entire fair-
ness rule requires a showing that a reasonably prudent director would have
made the challenged judgment (a probability). However, in holding recently
that the entire fairness test had not been met, the Delaware Supreme Court
said that no independent board of directors could have taken such action in
good faith and in the honest belief that it was in the best interests of the
corporation, citing a leading business judgment rule decision. 18  It is doubtful
that the entire fairness test is really intended to be broad enough to include a
range of errors of judgment the way the business judgment test is. While it
obviously intends a range of reasonable decisions, that range usually is be-
lieved to be narrower than the range encompassed by the business judgment
rule.187
It is suggested that the reason why the business judgment and fairness stan-
dards are so much alike is that they aim at the same norm, although for differ-
ent reasons. Both standards compare the challenged transaction with a trans-
action that could properly be approved by a hypothetical reasonable board of
directors acting in good faith and uninfluenced by negligence or incompetence
on the one hand, and bias or self-interest on the other. Thus, in deciding that a
challenged transaction had met the fairness test, the Delaware Supreme Court
said that if an independent board of directors had approved the transaction, a
reviewing court would not think of disturbing its judgment upon the matter, a
business judgment rule standard once again. 188
It is worth noting that the Delaware Supreme Court also uses the intrinsic
fairness test as the standard to be applied by the court of chancery in approv-
ing the settlement of a shareholders derivative action. In Neponsit Investment
Co. v. Abramson, 89 the court held that the chancellor must make more than a
cursory scrutiny of the issues and after weighing and considering the claims
and defenses determine the intrinsic fairness of the settlement in the exercise
of the court's sound business judgment. 90
VII. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR FREEZEOUT MERGER SELF-DEALING
It might be expected that the field of freezeout mergers would be an espe-
186. Summa, 540 A.2d at 407 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
187. In the 1977 amendments to the California statute, the state legislature applied the same
"just and reasonable" standard to transactions approved by disinterested directors as it applied to
transactions not approved by disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders, so that the effect
of such director approval is only to shift the burden of proof. However, transactions approved by a
majority of disinterested shareholders are not subject to the statutory "just and reasonable" stan-
dard. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1990). They are subject to a nonstatutory corporate waste
standard. See Gaillard v. Notomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
188. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (Del. 1956).
189. 405 A.2d 97 (Del. 1979).
190. Id. at 100 (citing Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49 (Del. 1964)).
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cially fertile one for application of fiduciary duty doctrines, and indeed it has
been. In a freezeout merger, a majority shareholder merges the controlled cor-
poration with another corporation wholly owned by him and eliminates the
minority shareholders in the first corporation by paying them in cash for their
shares. This technique was not available until the advent of the modern busi-
ness corporation statutes in the 1960s, which allowed the payment of cash as
consideration in mergers as well as securities. If the majority shareholder con-
trols the requisite majority of shares,' 9' the minority shareholders cannot block
the merger by voting against it. They have the right to demand a statutory
appraisal of the fair value of the shares,' 2 but the question is whether or not
they have any other rights. In the landmark case of Singer v. Magnavox
Co., '3 the Delaware Supreme Court decided that they do, applying the entire
fairness standard' as well as the rule that compliance with corporate statu-
tory provisions does not necessarily make corporate action valid in law.' 95
In the Singer case, the court held that the burden was on the majority
shareholder to establish the entire fairness of the merger to the minority share-
holders' 96 and in particular to establish that there was a business purpose for
the merger other than the elimination of the minority. 97 As a bill of rights for
minority shareholders, the Singer doctrine was to be short-lived. Almost at
once, the court severely weakened the holding by ruling in Tanzer v. Interna-
tional General Industries"' that the business purpose for the merger could be
a business purpose solely of the parent corporation and that a business purpose
of the controlled corporation did not have to be shown.'99 A few years later,
with Singer and Tanzer author Justice Duffy gone from the court and the
court membership expanded from three to five due to an intervening constitu-
tional amendment,"' the holdings of Singer and Tanzer that a business pur-
pose of any kind was necessary for a freezeout merger were overruled by a
unanimous court in the famous case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.203 For good
measure, the Weinberger decision also overruled two other recent decisions112
191. Most states require only a simple majority. See, e.g, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1991).
Some require a two-thirds majority. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1986). In
a short-form merger, where typically 90% is required, no vote of shareholders as such is required
at all. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253.
192. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
193. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
194. Id. at 980.
195. Id. at 975 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) to the
effect that "inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible").
196. Id. at 976.
197. Id. at 980.
198. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
199. Id. at 1124.
200. DEL. CONST. art IV, § 2, amended by 61 Del. Laws 533 (1978).
201. 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
202. Id. at 703-04, 715 (overruling Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979)
(Singer principle extended to short form merger) and Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d
497 (Del. 1981) (Delaware block method of stock valuation mandated for appraisal proceedings)).
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and established new guidelines for freezeout mergers:
(1) no independent business purpose is required for a freezeout merger;"'
(2) the statutory appraisal remedy is the exclusive remedy for minority
shareholders in a freezeout merger, except where fraud, misrepresentation,
self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable over-
reaching are involved;2 0 '
(3) proof of value of the minority shares in an appraisal or other stock valu-
ation proceeding may be made by any techniques or methods generally consid-
ered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court,
except any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger;25
(4) the plaintiff in a suit challenging a freezeout merger must allege specific
acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to demonstrate
the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority;206
(5) the initial burden is on the plaintiff attacking the merger to demonstrate
some basis for invoking the fairness obligation; 0 7
(6) the ultimate burden of proof is on the majority shareholder to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction is fair to the minority
shareholders; 08
(7) however, where the merger has been approved by an informed vote of a
majority of the minority shareholders, the burden of proof entirely shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority; 09
(8) before the burden shifts to the plaintiff, the majority shareholder has the
burden of proof that all material facts relevant to the transaction were dis-
closed to the minority shareholders voting on the merger;210
(9) proof of fairness might be shown by establishing an independent negoti-
ating committee of the outside directors of the controlled corporation to nego-
tiate the terms of the merger with the majority shareholder. 211
The Weinberger court clearly applied the entire fairness standard to the
merger and found it wanting in fairness since, among other things, the control-
ling shareholder had used members of the controlled corporation's board of
For developments since Weinberger in this area, see Julie G. Hudson, Comment, The Exclusivity
of the Appraisal Remedy Under the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act: Deciding the
Standard of Review for Cash-Out Mergers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 501 (1991).
203. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
204. Id. at 714-15.
205. Id. at 713.





211. Id. at 709 n.7. See generally Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Com-
mittee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged
Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAw. 665
(1988) (advocating the use of special committees of outside directors to evaluate interested direc-
tor transactions).
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directors in formulating its bid, and they, having a conflict of interest, did not
share their findings with their fellow directors. 2"3 For purposes of the present
discussion, however, the interesting question is what standard, business judg-
ment or entire fairness, is to be applied to the merger where the independent
negotiating committee technique, the majority of the minority shareholder ap-
proval technique, or both are used? Two recent Delaware Court of Chancery
decisions have given opposite answers to this question.
In Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,18 the chancery court had
before it a merger of Remington Arms Company into its parent and majority
shareholder, DuPont. The merger was negotiated by an independent commit-
tee of Remington directors and was expressly contingent upon the affirmative
vote of a majority of the Remington shares not owned by DuPont. Recogniz-
ing that under Weinberger the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority
shareholders shifted the burden of proving the merger was unfair to the plain-
tiff, the Citron court held that while the burden had shifted, the standard of
review had not.214 The court therefore applied the entire fairness standard, not
the business judgment standard, in holding that the merger was fair.21 In
doing so, the chancellor noted that another court of chancery decision was to
the contrary"' and that, in Weinberger itself, the Delaware Supreme Court
had cited a business-judgment waste-standard case in stating that the plaintiff
would have to prove the merger was unfair.2" 7
Before the 1970s, which was the era of the "going private" wars, no one
seemed to pay much attention to what the minority shareholders thought of
interested transactions with a majority shareholder. '" However, the device be-
came popular as a means of showing that the majority shareholder had not
controlled the transaction. Under the new California Corporations Code of
1977, interested director transactions might be validated by a vote of a major-
212. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-10.
213. 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990).
214. Id. at 500-02.
215. Id. at 505, 510.
216. Id. at 501 n.15 (citing In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No.
9844, slip op. at 16, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Oct. 21, 1988)) (vote of majority of minority
shareholders or independent negotiating committee of the board, if properly employed, invokes
business judgment standard and shifts burden to plaintiff); see also In re Triton Group Ltd.
Shareholders Litig., Cons. C.A. No. 11429, slip op. at 25, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26, (Feb. 22,
1991) (majority of minority shareholder vote shifts burden to plaintiff to prove unfairness), affd
sub nora. Glinert v. Lord, 1991 Del. LEXIS 315 (Sept. 27, 1991); American Gen. Corp. v. Texas
Air Corp., C.A. Nos. 8390, 8406, 8650, 8805, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987) (majority of
minority shareholder vote will, and independent negotiating committee of board may, shift burden
of persuasion to plaintiffs); cf. In re Republic Am. Corp. Litig., Cons. C.A. No. 10112, slip op. at
5, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31 (Apr. 4, 1989) (use of independent negotiating committee of Board
may invoke business judgment standard).
217. Citron. 584 A.2d at 501 n.15. The Weinberger court cited Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d
211 (Del. 1979). Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
218. Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1968) (citing Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc
Co., 226 A.2d 585 (N.J. 1967)) (holding majority of minority approval does not shift burden).
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ity of the minority shareholders, even if less than a quorum. 29 The controver-
sial new "going private" regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, finally adopted in 1979, also required the issuer in a going private
transaction to state whether the transaction was structured so that approval of
at least a majority of unaffiliated security holders was required.220
When the question of what effect to give to a majority of the minority
shareholders approval, where the merger was expressly conditioned on such
approval, was raised in the Weinberger case at the chancery court level, the
chancellor said it was a question of first impression.22 He decided to dismiss
that complaint for failure to state a cause of action, but with leave to amend.
When the plaintiff went to trial on an amended complaint, the chancellor held
that conditioning the freezeout merger on majority approval by the minority
shareholders did not relieve the majority shareholder of the burden to prove
the entire fairness of the merger. 222 He then held that the defendant had satis-
fied that burden,2 and as to that point he was reversed by the Delaware
Supreme Court. The supreme court also held that the defendant had not made
full disclosure to the minority shareholders in soliciting their approval, thereby
removing the question of burden shifting from the case, while noting that if
full disclosure had been made, the burden would have been on the plaintiff to
prove unfairness. 2 4 Since, as already mentioned, the supreme court cited a
waste standard decision at that point, this should have indicated that the
plaintiff would face a business judgment standard, but the chancellor in Citron
held that an intervening decision pointed in another direction. 22,
The intervening decision was Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.,228 and as the
chancellor stated, that case held that where, "as here,"221 7 a freezeout merger
is approved by a majority of the minority shareholders, the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove unfairness, but the Rosenblatt court then seemed to apply an
entire fairness standard.22 8 Although a majority of the minority shareholders
219. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(l) (West 1990). Although the reference is to approval by the
shareholders under section 153, with interested shares not entitled to vote, and section 153 re-
quires a majority of a quorum, under section 112 shares not entitled to vote are not counted in
determining a quorum or required vote. See HAROLD MARSH & R. Roy FINKLE, MARSH'S CALI-
FORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 11.10 (3d ed. 1990).
220. Rule 13e-100. Schedule 13E-3, Item 8(c), adopted in Exchange Act Release No. 34-
16075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (SEC 1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3).
221. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Del. Ch. 1979).
222. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1347 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
223. Id. at 1363.
224. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
225. Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 1990).
226. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
227. Id. at 937; see Rand D. Richey, Note, Balancing the Rights of Majority and Minority
Shareholders in Take-Out Mergers: Trends in Delaware Law, 25 NEW ENG. L. REv. 699, 721
(1990).
228. See Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937.
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in Rosenblatt had approved the merger,229 the merger was not conditioned on
receiving such approval,2 30 and the chancellor therefore held that he would
assume without deciding that the defendant majority shareholder still had the
burden to prove intrinsic fairness."' The Rosenblatt decision is confusing and
is cited in the ALT Principles both as establishing a waste standard2 32 and as
establishing an unfairness standard.133
There does not seem to be any good reason to shift the burden of proof to
the plaintiff where the merger was not conditioned on receiving a majority of
the minority shareholders' approval, even if such approval was obtained. If the
minority does not have the power to veto the merger, its opinion is advisory.
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently held that the burden does not shift
in this situation, and that holding was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme
Court.2"4 As to the standard to be applied, the waste standard is the one ap-
plied by the Delaware courts where self-dealing transactions have been ap-
proved after full disclosure by corporate authority having the power to do
so,235 and it should be applied in the freezeout merger case, too.
With respect to the independent board committee, the Weinberger court did
not say that use of such a committee would shift the burden of proof, and it is
hard to understand why it would. Neither the committee nor the full board
itself has the authority to approve such a merger, which must be submitted to
the shareholders unless a short-form merger is involved. However, the ap-
proval of an independent committee should be strong evidence for the majority
shareholder since the entire fairness standard, as has been discussed, merely
requires him to prove that the transaction would recommend itself to an inde-
pendent company.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to clarify the analytical framework for appli-
cation of the corporate director's fiduciary duty of loyalty. First of all, we
should stop avoiding the use of the word "fiduciary." Because all agents are
fiduciaries, everyone working for the corporation is a fiduciary, although most
will have little occasion to exercise any fiduciary power. If a corporate director
229. Id. at 936.
230. Id. at 939.
231. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., C.A. No. 5278, slip op. at 13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1983),
reprinted in 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 366, 384-85 (1983).
232. PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 5.10 reporter's note at 428.
233. Id. § 5.01 reporter's note at 271; cf Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846
(Del. 1987) (majority of minority shareholder vote shifts burden of proving unfairness to
plaintiff).
234. Rabkin v. Olin Corp., Cons. C.A. No. 7547, slip op. at 16-20, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50
(Apr. 17, 1990), afl'd without op., 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990).
235. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (approval by majority of disin-
terested shareholders puts burden on plaintiff to prove waste); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d
952, 957 (Del. Ch. 1980) (approval by majority of minority shareholders of contract with parent
corporation places burden on plaintiff to prove waste).
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does not want to be a fiduciary, he will have to rid himself of the power to
manage other people's property, and that he cannot do.
We should continue to use the term "duty of loyalty." It is the essence of
the fiduciary that he has a duty of loyalty, which has been defined to mean
avoidance of conflict of interest. Simply put, no man can serve two masters.
We have been led astray in the application of this principle to the corporate
director cases due in large part to Professor Marsh's assurance that interested
director transactions were voidable without regard to fairness at common law.
They were not, and it would perhaps put our minds at ease if we were to
rephrase the definition as follows: No man can serve two masters without dis-
closure and informed consent.
The statutes on interested director contracts were designed to simplify the
problem, not complicate it as we have allowed them to do. They were intended
to facilitate such contracts by allowing a minority of the board to act and even
by allowing the interested director to act so long as the transaction is fair. The
director is a businessperson, not a member of some holy order, and this area of
the law should be rid of the mystical cant that has surrounded it. If no court
ever again refers to the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, our analysis
will be greatly aided. If an interested director transaction has been approved
by independent, informed corporate authority, it should only be reviewed
under the business judgment rule.
The meanings of the terms in this area need to be better understood: disin-
terested director, interested director, fairness, business judgment, burden of
proof, and good faith. There is no reason to continue to tolerate the confusion
that has been engendered by lack of definition. With respect to the Principles
of Corporate Governance, it is submitted that the Institute is in error in substi-
tuting mechanical rules for fiduciary analysis. If mechanical rules are to be
imposed, they should be imposed by the legislature.
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